We construct daily market-based measures of distance to default for large U.S. financial institutions since 1973. These measures have significant predictive power for institution bankruptcy more than one year in advance. We aggregate the distances to default across institutions to provide an index of the overall health of the financial-services industry. We show that deteriorations in this Financial Institution Health Index are associated with tighter lending standards and higher interest rates on bank loans and precede declines in employment and industrial production. We argue that this points to the condition of financial institutions as an independent source of macroeconomic variability, distinct from traditional accelerator mechanisms.
Introduction
Nonfinancial firms borrow to finance their operations primarily from two sources: the bond market and banks. Changes in the cost of these funds and in the ability of non-financial firms to access these sources will affect the ability of the firms to operate and, if these changes are widespread, will have consequences for real economic activity. The relationship between conditions in the bond market and the real economy has been the subject of considerable analysis, recently by Gilchrist, Ya nkov, and Zakrajšek (2009) but also by Stock and Watson (1989) ; Duca (1999) ; Gertler and Lown (1999) ; Mody and Taylor (2004); and King, Levin, and Perli (2007) . The relationship between conditions in the banking sector, particularly with respect to the condition of the banks themselves, and real economic activity has received less attention, possibly because this relationship is somewhat more complex than that between the bond market and economic activity. 1 In the bond market, a nonfinancial firm's cost of funds likely depends largely on its own financial condition. 2 For bank lending, the nonfinancial firm's cost of funds depends on its financial condition, but is also affected by bank lending policies and likely by the bank's own cost of funds; these factors may in turn depend on the bank's financial condition. 3 In this paper, we advance our understanding of the relationship between bank condition, bank credit intermediation, and economic activity by developing a new measure of financial sector health, analyzing its relationship with changes in bank lending policies, and showing that it has some forecasting ability for macroeconomic developments.
While the connection between bank health, bank lending policies, and economic activity has received less attention than the connection between the bond market and the macroeconomy, there has been notable work in this area. For example, Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006) present a model showing that as banks' health declines and they move closer to violating their capital adequacy requirements, they need to increase deposit rates to retain funds and raise loan rates to maintain profitability; higher loan rates and increased costs of credit, in turn, reduce borrowing activity and restrain economic growth. Similarly, a number of microeconomic studies have found evidence in favor a link between impaired financial sector 1 Though, as we discuss below, various aspects of this relationship have been the subject of notable research.
2 Of course, pricing in the both bond market and bank lending policies are likely affected by expectations about the overall macroeconomic environment and risk preferences.
3 While one would expect that pricing in the bond market might affect the rates banks charge on loans, and vice versa, there is likely to be imperfect substitution. Diamond (1991) provides a theoretical reason why there might be some separation between the two markets. Berger and Udell (1995) argue that some borrowers, especially small ones, are more likely to depend on the relationship lending provided by banks.
health and higher borrowing costs/lower investment (Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 2002 , Gibson, 1995 , Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese, 2002 . 4 In this paper, we build on this previous work by considering the effect of aggregate financialinstitution health in a more macroeconomic setting and find that the general health of the financial sector has a notable impact on indicators of credit conditions and is importantly related to macroeconomic performance.
A key requirement of our analysis is that we have a measure of financialsector health that (1) accurately reflects the aggregate condition of important financial institutions and (2) extends far enough into the past to provide sufficient variation for time-series analysis. We begin by developing such a measure, using a Merton asset-pricing framework to construct daily "distances to default" for large U.S. financial intuitions-including commercial banks, investment banks, and other large intermediaries-since 1973. At an individual-institution level, we show that these measures are good predictors of failure up to 15 months in advance and are highly correlated with spreads on credit default swaps for the subsample over which those data are available. As such, our results are similar to an increasing body of work, such as Basurto, Goodhart, and Hofmann (2006) ; Gropp, Ve s a l a , and Vulpes (2006); and Harada, Ito, and Takahashi (2010) , that find such measures to be useful in providing a market-based signal about the health of particular institutions. We thus take an aggregation of the individual distance to default measures (specifically, the log median) as a meaningful, market-based indicator of concern about the health of financial institutions. We refer to this measure as the Financial Institution Health Index (FIHI).
We then test whether this index is related to changes in aggregate credit conditions; such findings help motivate why financial-sector health might influence economic activity. Specifically, we test whether changes in the FIHI are associated with changes in lending standards and terms as reported in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of Bank Lending Practices. We find that it is indeed the case that deteriorations in the FIHI are followed by reports by senior bank loan officers that they tightened lending standards and that they widened the spread between loan rates and their bank's cost of funds. We also compute the spread between rates on business loans and LIBOR using data from banks' Call Reports and the Survey of the Terms of Business Lending and confirm that these spreads widen (narrow) when the health of the financial sector declines (improves). These findings suggests that financial-sector health is a factor in determining the ability of nonfinancial firms to obtain credit.
Finally, we test whether our index of the condition of the financial sector is related to economic prospects. Using an exercise similar to Gilchrist, Ya nkov, and Zakrajšek (2009) , we look at whether higher levels of the FIHI, a healthier financial sector, are associated with more rapid growth in employment and industrial production over the next three to twelve months. We find a fairly strong association between our measure and subsequent economic activity, even after controlling for other financial indicators such as equity market returns and credit spreads on corporate bonds. Indeed, the connection between financial-institution health and economic activity is considerably stronger than the one between credit spreads and economic activity. Our earlier finding that financial sector health affects lending conditions suggests that at least a portion of the association with economic activity reflects a causal relationship running from financial-sector health to the real economy.
Our empirical research is motivated by the idea that a change in the health of a financial intermediary (which we will refer to simply as a "bank" when no ambiguity results) will affect its borrowing costs, lending rates, and lending standards. A decline in the health of a bank and an increase in the risk it will fail should raise its borrowing costs, especially for funds obtained through financial markets, such as commercial paper, money market CDs, or corporate bonds. As the bank's borrowing costs increase, it may charge higher rates on the loans it makes in order to support its profitability. The bank may also respond to a deterioration in its condition by tightening lending standards as lower loan losses might allow it to rebuild its capital. As credit conditions tighten and the cost of credit increases, nonfinancial firms might scale back their investment and economic activity may be restrained.
The idea that the health of financial intermediaries matters for real activity is distinct from, but complementary to, the literature on financial accelerators and similar amplification mechanisms for macroeconomic shocks (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 , Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999 . In these models, savers are the source of funds, firms need to borrow these funds, and intermediaries help transfer the funds from savers to firms. Dynamics in such models are driven by shocks to the condition of the borrower; financial intermediaries play a crucial role, but they are generally passive. Our work builds on the idea that these financial institutions could also be an independent source of macroeconomic dynamics. Financial intermediaries are themselves dependent on debt financing, so that if their condition deteriorates they will face higher borrowing costs which may be passed on to borrowing firms. Higher lending rates increase external finance premia and affect investment decisions even for borrowers of unchanged quality. In other words, financial-sector health should partially determine whether the financial accelerator is economically important.
Although several previous studies at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic level have suggested that the health of the financial sector ought to matter for economic activity, this work has tended to focus on short periods or particular episodes in which the condition of the banking sector deteriorated notably. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) use a large panel of banking-crisis data to show that such crises tend to lead to recessions, but it is not clear from their results how the condition of the financial sector affects the economy in less extreme circumstances. Similarly, Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Zicchino (2007) use a measure of the probability of default that is zero unless it crosses a relatively high threshold. Our paper builds on these and other studies by looking for systematic effects of changes in the condition of the financial system on the real economy, using a broad, continuous index of financial health that is measured with high frequency over a relatively long sample.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the creation of our measure of the health of financial institutions and provide evidence that our measures have predictive power for distress in the cross-section. We then aggregate the firm-level measures and show that the resulting index provides a picture of the relative health of the U.S. financial sector over time. Section 3 presents the results of our tests relating our distance to default measure to lending conditions, and Section 4 presents results regarding the association between financial sector health and economic activity. Section 5 concludes.
Measuring Financial-Institution Health
We construct a measure of the distance to default for a sample of financial institutions based on the Merton (1974) asset-pricing model. This method uses the difference between the market value of a firm's assets and its liabilities and the volatility of the value of assets to provide a measure of how close a firm is to having liabilities exceed assets. The sample of institutions used in our analysis includes large commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial intuitions. Thus, our sample is more likely to reflect the condition of the broad financial system than if we included only commercial banks, as some previous studies have. We are able to calculate daily distances to default back to 1973, providing us with a relatively long time series.
Data and methodology
Using data from Compustat, we select the 25 largest financial institutions by assets in each quarter since 1973. These financial institutions are limited to depository institutions, non-depository credit institutions, securities and commodity brokers and dealers, and their holding companies. 5 There are 67 separate firms that are included in the top 25 firms in at least one quarter. These firms, together with the dates each one first and last appeared in the top 25, are listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. We match the quarterly balance sheet data from Compustat for all the institutions in our list to daily data from CRSP on stock prices and equity shares outstanding. 6 The institutions constituting the top 25 represent about 55 percent of the assets in the mid-1980s. Consistent with the consolidation in the industry, this portion rises to around 75 percent by the end of the sample period. Prior to the mid-1980s, the number of firms included in Compustat is more limited and our top institutions account for around 70 percent of the assets.
To calculate our measure of distance to default, we need information on liabilities, the market value of assets, and the volatility of the market value of assets. Compustat provides information on total liabilities. (We linearly interpolate total liabilities between quarterly reporting dates.) To compute the market value of assets and the volatility of the market value of assets, we use standard formulas based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) , as described in Crosbie and Bohn (2003) . The market value of a firm's equity at time t, E t , can be thought of as a call option on the market value of the firm's assets, V t , with a strike price equal to the current book value of the firm's debt, D t . Using the Black-Scholes formula:
where r t is the risk free interest rate, T is a measure of the time horizon of interest, σ V , is the volatility of the market value of assets, N represents the cumulative normal distribution, and N(d t ) is the delta of the option:
The market value of the firm's equity is also observable, but the market value of assets and the volatility of that market value are not. However, asset volatility can be estimated using the relationship between asset and equity volatility, σ E , from the Black-Scholes model:
5 We select these institutions by limiting our institutions to those with SIC codes between 6000 and 6300 or between 6700 and 6720. Government sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are excluded from the sample.
6 Data from CRSP are obtained from the Wharton Data Service (WRDS) and are the intellectual property of WRDS.
Equations 1 and 3 can be solved jointly for V and σ V . Following much of the literature, we focus on a one-year time horizon. For the risk free rate, we use the one-year Treasury rate.
Often, σ E is measured as an implied volatility from equity options. However, these options are not available for the early part of our sample period. As a substitute we use exponentially weighted realized volatilities:
where x it is firm i's return in day t, µ i is its average return over the sample, and α is a firm-specific smoothing parameter to be estimated. To determine α, we follow the procedure discussed in Foster and Nelson (1996) . 7 These authors derive a formula that maps the variance of the daily changes in volatility into a choice for α that produces asymptotically efficient estimates of stochastic volatility processes. In practice, this variance can be estimated by guessing a value for α and computing the volatility sequence σ 2 1 ,···,σ 2˜T using the above equation. The Foster-Nelson formula then provides a new value α, and the procedure can be iterated until convergence.
Similar to Liu, Papakirykos, and Yu a n (2006), we use a Z-score as our measure of the distance to default: We calculate this measure as: 8
Using the entire stock price history of each firm from 1973 (or its initial public offering date) through the second quarter of 2009 (or the date the firm's equity stopped trading), we calculate the firm-level distances to default on a daily basis. In addition to Basurto, Goodhart, and Hofmann (2006) ; Gropp, Ve s a l a , and Vulpes (2006); Liu, Papakirykos, and Yu a n (2006); and Harada, Ito, and Takahashi 7 It is also possible to use the Foster-Nelson procedure to derive flat-weight rolling variance estimators (i.e., fixed-length rolling windows). However, as they show, this is generally not optimal relative to the exponential weighting. Importantly, our implementation imposes a constant conditional kurtosis of 3, consistent with conditional (though not necessarily unconditional) normality of equity returns. We exclude the day of the 1987 stock market crash from our computations because of both its extreme outlying values and likely inaccuracies in pricing data reported that day.
8 Expected default frequencies (EDFs) can be computed as monotonic transformations of distances to default by feeding them through an assumed PDF or a function estimated from the data. The latter approach is taken by the well known KMV measure of expected default, produced by Moody's. We experimented with such transformations but did not find them to add useful information beyond that contained in the Z score itself. In computing our measures, we assume riskneutrality.
(2010) already mentioned, other work that has applied the distance to default framework to banks includes DeNicolo and Tieman (2006); Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Zicchino (2007); and Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) . Our measure expands on this previous work in at least three important ways for the United States: (1) by extending the sample significantly back in time; (2) by using a realized-volatility measure that is optimal in the Foster-Nelson sense; and (3) by extending the sample to financial institutions other than commercial banks.
Performance at the Firm Level
While there are some concerns about interpreting the distance to default measure literally, the Z-score likely still serves as a useful index of firm health. 9 Indeed, Bharath and Shumway (2008) find that similar measures based on a Merton framework have significant forecasting power for defaults by nonfinancial firms. Gropp, Ve s a l a , and Vulpes (2006) find that distance-to-default measures also predict troubles at financial institutions. In this section, we briefly verify these result for our sample.
We begin with two case studies. The first is Continental Illinois (referred to as Continental Bancorp in the Appendix Table A1 ), which famously collapsed and was rescued by the FDIC in 1984. We plot our distance to default measure for this institution between 1979 and 1985 and highlight some related events in Figure 1 . The distance-to-default measure appears to capture market concerns quite well in this example. It declines in 1982, around the time of the failure of Penn Square, a bank that had sold Continental Illinois a number of bad loans, and shows renewed default concerns around the time of the bank run on May 8, 1984. The distance to default measure continued to fall over the next few months and only reversed direction around the time of the approval of the FDIC rescue plan by the shareholders of Continental Illinois Corporation on September 26, 1984. 10 A more recent example is Lehman Brothers (shown in Figure 2 ), whose collapse was closely tied to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. Our distance to default measure for Lehman turns down shortly following the closure of two hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns in mid-2007 and the ensuing turmoil in financial markets. In early August, BNP Paribas suspended redemption from three funds it operated; soon after equity market volatility increased and short-term 9 One concern is that financial institutions, especially commercial banks, are likely to be closed by regulators prior to the complete erosion of capital; thus, the default condition is not the one assumed in the Merton model. See Chan-Lau and Sy (2007) To capture these dynamics more systematically, we perform a simple event study. Of the 67 firms that ever appear in our sample, 20 filed for bankruptcy, received government bailouts to prevent failure, or were acquired under distressed conditions between 1973 and 2009. The firms for which these events occurred, with their respective dates, are indicated in Table A1 . 11 The average distances-to-default for these firms, together with bands indicating two standard deviations around their sample mean, are plotted in Figure 3 over the five years leading up to each failure. The horizontal solid line indicates the average distance to default of 4.1 for our entire sample. Distances to default of failing institutions begin to trend downward about two years prior to failure, and they are statistically different from average, at the 95 percent confidence level, about 15 months prior to failure. 48  46  44  42  40  38  36  34  32  30  28  26  24  22  20  18  16  14  12  10  8  6  4  2  0 Distance to Default
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Note. The figure shows the sample average of the distance to default across the 20 failing institutions in our sample (solid black line) in the months approaching their failure, together with two-standard-deviation bands (dotted lines). The horizontal red line at 4.12 indicates the average distance to default among all banks in our sample.
Relation to Credit Default Swap Spreads
In recent years, another measure of expectations of default probabilities is provided by credit default swaps (CDS). We compared weekly changes in our distance to default measure to weekly changes in spreads on CDS by looking at correlations in the two measures and by regressing changes in the CDS spread on our default measure and looking at the ability of the distance of default measure to "explain" Note. Based on weekly observations. Number of observations in parentheses.
changes in the CDS spread. These comparisons are conducted for the 20 institutions in our list that had at least three years of observations of both measures between 2000 and 2007.
The results are shown in Table 1 . In general, CDS spreads and our distance to default measure move closely together. 12 The correlation of the weekly changes in the two measures for these institutions ranged from .42 to .75 and averaged about .64. We take these results as evidence supporting our distance-to-default measure as an indicator of financial-institution health at the firm level.
12 Of course, we would not expect these movements to relate exactly because our measure is based on equity-market information, whereas CDS spreads reflect expected losses on debt. The distinction is likely to be particularly meaningful for large financial institutions because their debt probably enjoyed some perception of implicit government guarantee.
Construction of the Index
The log median distance of the top 25 firms serves as our Financial Institution Health Index (FIHI), plotted in Figure 4 . We take the log to capture our informal intuition that a given-sized movement in asset values when a firm is close to default is likely to have a bigger effect on both market prices and the firm's behavior than the same-sized movement when the firm is far away from default. 13 We use the median because it is more likely to reflect the general condition of the financial institutions in our sample than other measures of central tendency. We have tried alternative weighting schemes and transformations, but, in the empirical exercises to follow, the resulting measures do not produce materially different results than the log median. 14 One plausible alternative, the log asset-weighted average distance to default, is shown for comparison in the figure and can be seen to differ only slightly from the FIHI. 15 The behavior of the FIHI matches the historical record well. During periods when there was concern about the health of the financial sector, distances to default move sharply lower. The earliest such period of distress appears in 1974, around the time of the Herstatt and Franklin National bank failures. 16 There is also a notable decrease in the FIHI around the time of the 1987 stock market crash. The measure also fell to quite low levels in the early 1990s around the time when bank profitability was low, concerns circulated about a credit crunch, and bank failures were elevated. Perhaps the most notable of these failures was the Bank of New England, which (together with its affiliated institutions) was seized by the FDIC in early 1991, just as the FIHI hit a local minimum. The index also stays lower for longer during the early-90s banking crisis than in most previous periods of financial distress. The turmoil in the financial sector following the Russian default and troubles at Long Term Capital Management in 1998 are also apparent, as are concerns about the financial sector following the declines in equity markets in 2000 and the WorldCom default in 2002.
According to our measure, financial sector health was quite robust for a relatively extended period from 2004 through 2006. However, the FIHI then falls precipitously from early 2007 to reach the lowest point in the history of the series in late 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The index rebounded through the end of the sample (July 2009), but only to levels reached during the depths of previous stress episodes. 17 It is worthwhile noting compositional shifts in our index, since the institutions that constitute the largest 25 institutions have changed over time. These changes occur as institutions merge and as their relative size changes. 18 However, such shifts tend to happen only gradually: the average number of new firms each quarter is 0.77 (i.e. there are about three changes to the panel in a year). A time series of the number of changes to the firms included in the index from one quarter to the next is shown in Figure 5 . The number of changes is generally small; in only 16 The Herstatt bank failure is remembered for the issues related to clearing and settlement risk that arose. At the time it was closed, Herstatt had received some currency as part of a foreign exchange swap but the matching payments to the non-German banks had not yet been cleared. As a result, several banks lost considerable sums. Franklin National was the 20th largest bank in the U.S. at the time it failed. See Wojnilower (1980) for a discussion of these events. 17 As noted earlier, we view the index as indicative of financial sector health rather than as providing a precised value of the likelihood of default. Also, once we have taken medians and logs to construct the index presented here, a numerical value of zero has no special economic significance whatsoever. 18 Institutions drop out at the point when they merge or fail (usually when the equity price is no longer available). We do not observe a significant change in the index on days in which institutions are removed for either of these reasons which suggests that these compositional shifts are not strongly affecting the index. a handful of quarters does the composition of the index change by more than two institutions. Thus, we argue that our measure is broadly comparable over time. 19 Figure 5: Number of changes in firms included in the index Commercial banks account for roughly two-thirds of the institutions included in the sample. Over time, the share of institutions in the top 25 that consist of institutions other than commercial banks has edged higher, from four in the first years of the sample to eight at the end of the sample. To investigate the implications of these compositional shifts, we calculated the distance to default measure separately for commercial banks and non-commercial banks (using the median of the twelve largest institutions in each group). The resulting two daily time series have a correlation coefficient of .84. The median distance to default is a bit lower for non-commercial banks, but the difference is not large. Moreover the difference diminishes during the latter half of the sample period when non-commercial banks constitute a larger part of the sample of institutions used to construct the FIHI.
It is also instructive to consider the dispersion of risk across large firms over time. The time series of the interquartile range of the log distance to default for the 25 index firms is shown in Figure 6 . We find that the largest differences in the quartiles during periods occurred when there was the least concern about the health of the financial sector (when the FIHI was high). Conversely, during periods of heightened concern about the financial sector, the interquartile range is generally relatively small. These results suggest that, when our measure indicates an elevated level of concern about the financial system, it tends to reflect concerns about the broad financial sector, rather than about individual institutions. 
Relation of the index to bank intermediation
In this section, we investigate whether changes in financial institution health are associated with changes in lending conditions. Motivation for this idea can be found in a number of recent theoretical papers. Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2005) and Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Zicchino (2007) provide models of the banking sector involving differentiated banks, an interbank market, a loan market, and choice of repayment by individual banks. In these models, banks respond to an increase in capital requirements by increasing their risk profile; in equilibrium, this raises the rates that banks must pay depositors and, via cost pass-through, the rates on loans. Higher borrowing costs lead to reduced borrowing and lower economic activity. Gorton and He (2008) also model the connection between bank condition and lending standards, where deteriorations in bank condition can be observed through greater loan losses. Gorton and He argue that information about loan losses provides other banks information about the lending standards of other banks and that larger loan losses lead to tighter lending standards. These tighter lending conditions in turn reduce borrowing and reduce economic activity. 20 Previous empirical work related to this channel has tended to focus on measures of capital adequacy. For example, Bernanke and Lown (1991) argue that weak capital ratios were associated with low levels of loan growth during the "credit crunch" of the early 1990s, and, using data on syndicated loans, Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002) find that less well capitalized banks tend to charge higher loan rates than well capitalized banks. On the other hand, recent work by Berrospide and Edge (2010) finds that changes in capital ratios have only a modest effect on bank lending. This echoes older research by Berger and Udell (1994) arguing that capital constraints had little effect on bank lending in the early 1990s. However, the capital ratios used in these studies-even the risk-based capital ratios that are sometimes used-may fail to detect changes in the overall risk profile of the institution, or may detect them only with a lag. Although book-value capital adequacy is an important aspect of financial-institution soundness, it is not a sufficient statistic for bank health, as the Gorton-He model makes clear. In contrast, the FIHI should pick up changes in overall risk and do so in real time, at least insofar as these changes become evident to the market. Thus, it should include any information embedded in book-capital ratios but may respond to other factors as well.
Reported changes in lending conditions
One source of information on changes in bank lending standards and lending terms is the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of Bank Lending Practices (SLOOS). Four times a year, the Federal Reserve surveys a sample of senior bank loan officers regarding changes in lending conditions for a variety of loan types. We focus here on the questions regarding commercial and industrial (C&I) loans given the previous research indicating that commercial borrowers are affected by bank health. In particular, we consider the shares of survey respondents that reported tightening or easing lending standards for large and middle-market firms and the share of survey respondents that indicated that they increased or decreased the spread of C&I loan rates over their cost of funds for large and middle-market firms. The Federal Reserve reports the net percentage of respondents that reported tightening standards and the net percentage increasing the spread. 21 We regress these 20 While many of these arguments are focused on commercial banks, rising borrowing costs might also lead investment banks to charge more for underwriting equity or debt issuance and otherwise restrain their ability to provide intermediation services. 21 The net percentage of respondents is the percentage reporting tightening standards (increasing spreads) minus the percentage that reported easing standards (decreasing spreads). net percentages on our index. Since the question in the SLOOS asks about changes in standards or pricing, we uses changes in our index rather than the level of our index. 22 We also include a variety of control variables in our regression. On the SLOOS, banks often point to changes in their outlook for the economy as a reason for having tightened lending conditions. To control for this possibility, we include changes in the median forecast for real GDP growth from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A second control variable is the change in the delinquency rate for C&I loans, which measures changes in the performance of the loans on banks' books. We include both contemporaneous and lagged independent variables in the regression and also include the lagged dependent variable. To control for autocorrelation in the error terms in the regressions, we use Newey-West standard errors. The SLOOS data are available quarterly starting in 1991Q1 and our sample ends in 2009Q2.
The results appear in Table 2 . We find that an improvement in the condition of financial institutions-an increase in the median log distance to default-is associated with a smaller percentage of banks reporting that they tightened either lending standards or terms. The response in lending conditions associated with changes in financial health appears to be fairly quick, as the coefficient on the contemporaneous change in the FIHI is significant but the coefficient on the lagged change in the FIHI is not. To judge the economic significance of the results, consider that between the third and fourth quarters of 2008, our index decreased .28 points, one of the largest quarterly moves; our regression coefficients suggest that this move boosted the net percentage of banks reporting tightening standards for C&I loans on the January 2009 survey by 9 percentage points and boosted the net percentage of banks increasing spreads on C&I loans over their cost of funds by 18 percentage points, relative to what would have been the case had there been no change in our index. 23 With regard to the control variables, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable suggests that reports of changes in lending conditions are quite persis-22 This procedure is consistent with the idea that it is changes in bank health that prompt changes in lending standards, similar to the dynamics in Gorton and He (2008) . One could also take the view that banks tighten lending standards more when their condition is generally poor by historical standards and regress changes in lending standards on the level of our index. Doing so produces an even stronger association. 23 For the sample period, the average absolute value of the net percent of banks reporting that they tightened lending standards (terms) is 19 (39) percent. That changes in the financial sector health would have an effect, if modest in size, is consistent with reports by the banks on the survey. Loan officers do cite deteriorations in their bank's capital position as a reason for tightening standards on occasion but more frequently cite changes in overall economic conditions or in the outlook for specific industries. Note. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Standard errors adjusted following Newey and West (1987) .
tent. A deterioration in the quality of banks' loan portfolios-an increase in the delinquency rate-is associated with a larger percentage of banks reporting that they increased spreads on loans; we do not find a statistically significant impact on the percentage reporting that they tightened standards. Somewhat surprisingly, our measure of changes in the economic outlook-a decrease in the expected growth rate of real GDP from the Survey of Professional Forecasters-is not associated with reports of adjustments to lending conditions by respondents to the SLOOS.
Measures of changes in spreads on C&I loans
Because they are based on survey responses, the SLOOS results constitute qualitative evidence that changes in lending conditions are influenced by changes in the financial sector health. Here we test directly whether changes in our log distance to default measure are associated with changes in the spread between rates on C&I loans and a measure of banks' cost of funds. We use two measures of the rate on C&I loans. The first is an imputed rate earned on these loans calculated from information reported by banks on the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports); specifically, we divide quarterly interest earned on C&I loans by the average outstanding amounts of these loans. Given that our measure of financial sector health focuses on large institutions, we calculate loan rates using data on the largest 100 banks. Our second indicator of the rate on C&I loans comes from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL) which asks a sample of banks to report the rate on all C&I loans extended during a particular week of the quarter. We use the weighted average effective rate for loans with a maturity of one-month to one-year extended by large banks. In both cases, we compute the difference between the loan rate and a market-based cost of funds for banks, in this case six-month LIBOR.
As in the previous sub-section, we regress changes in spreads on C&I loans on changes in the FIHI as well as control variables. We include changes in the slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference between the yield on the tenyear nominal Treasury and the one-year nominal Treasury, to capture benefits banks may have from a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. (Changes in the yield curve may also reflect changes in the forecast for economic conditions. See King, Levin, Perli, 2007.) To control for changes in loan performance, we again include the change in the delinquency rates on C&I loans. In the regressions, we include both contemporaneous and lagged independent variables. As before, we use Newey-West standard errors. Data are available starting in 1987Q1 and our sample ends in 2009Q2.
The results, shown in Table 3 , suggest that a deterioration in the health of the financial sector-a decrease in the FIHI-is associated with a subsequent increase in the spread between C&I loan rates and six-month LIBOR. This result holds regardless of which measure of C&I loan rates we use. We consider again the decline of .28 points in the index between the third and fourth quarters of 2008. For the C&I loan rate based on Call Report data, our regression results suggest that the spread of this rate over six-month LIBOR would have increased by 25 basis points relative to what would have been the case had the health of financial institutions been unchanged. For C&I loan rates from the STBL, the results suggest that the decline in the FIHI of .28 points increased the spreads between rates on C&I loans and LIBOR by 23 basis points. 24 With respect to the control variables, our results indicate that a rise in the delinquency rates on C&I loans tends to increase the difference between rates on C&I loans and LIBOR, as one would expect. A steepening of the yield curve is associated with a decrease in the loan rate-LIBOR spread. One possible explanation for this finding is that a steepening yield curve reflects improved economic prospects which may also prompt banks to ease lending standards and terms. Note. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Standard errors adjusted following Newey and West (1987) .
Changes in liquidity provision
In a recent article, Berger and Bouwman (2009) argue that another important role that banks play in financial intermediation is liquidity creation-using liquid liabilities to fund illiquid assets. If a bank's financial condition is related to liquidity provision, then this could be another channel through which bank health affects financial intermediation. Further, as loans tend to be less liquid, reductions in the liquidity provision might also signal tighter lending conditions. We conduct some simple tests to look for a relationship. The measure of liquidity provision developed by Berger and Bouwman is based on the difference between the amount of illiquid assets/illiquid off-balance sheet exposures/liquid liabilities on bank balance sheets and the amount of liquid assets/liquid off-balance sheet exposures/illiquid liabilities. We construct this measure using Call Report data for commercial banks and compute quarterly percent changes; as in the previous section we focus on the largest 100 institutions. Information on the Call Report regarding off-balance sheet exposures has changed from time to time; to ensure consistency in the measure used here, we start our sample period in 1990.
Our test for a relationship between changes in liquidity provision and changes in health of financial institutions is a Granger Causality test. The results are shown in Table 4 . We find that changes in the FIHI Granger Cause changes in liquidity provision, but liquidity creation does not Granger Cause changes in the FIHI. The coefficients suggest that increases in financial sector health tend to result in more liquidity creation.
Discussion
Summing up, consistent with the empirical work looking at cross-sectional connections between bank health and bank lending, we find that movements in our index that indicate a decline in the health of the financial sector is associated with more restrictive lending conditions-both tighter lending standards and increases in the spreads charged on business loans. In a given quarter, the change in lending conditions in response to changes in the condition of financial institutions appears to be generally modest. However, it is important to note that these changes would be cumulative. A persistent deterioration in financial sector health would, over time, result in significantly tighter lending conditions, and a persistent improvement in financial sector health would lead to notably easier lending conditions. We also find that a deterioration in financial sector health tends to be followed by a reduction in liquidity provision by banks. Thus, the results in this section support our hypothesis that a channel through which financial sector health can affect the real economy is by affecting lending conditions and the cost of funds faced by borrowers.
Relation of the financial health index to the real economyǏ
n this section, we present the results of investigations into whether our measure of financial sector health is related to developments in the real economy. There is already empirical support for the notion that the condition of financial institutions might have important macroeconomic effects, although much of it is more narrowly focused on either specific institutions or specific periods. Studies of Japanese banks in the 1990s, such as Gibson (1995) , have shown that declines in the health of the banks resulted in lower investment on the part of their Japanese customers. Further, Peek and Rosengren (2000) find that the deterioration in the position of Japanese banks reduced activity in the U.S. commercial real estate markets that were dependent on Japanese bank lending while commercial real estate markets linked to non-Japanese banks saw no declines in activity. At the aggregate level, Bernanke (1983) looks at the experience of the United States in the Great Depression and finds that bank failures decreased economic activity. More recently, Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, and Zicchino (2007) use a vector autoregression involving GDP growth, inflation, bank profitability, and a measure of the probability of bank default. They find that increases in the probability that banks default have a negative effect on GDP growth. Taking a different approach, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have documented that financial crises have typically been followed by economic downturns in both developed and developing economies over the last 200 years. Finally, Meh and Moran (2010) find that shocks to bank capital in a calibrated DSGE model cause large declines in output. Our tests here should be viewed as complementary to this previous work, with the notable advantage of our longer and more-comprehensive measure of financial-sector health. As our measures of developments in the real economy, we use nonfarm payroll employment from the the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the index of industrial production from the Federal Reserve. Both of these measures are available at a monthly frequency and are available for the entire period for which we have computed our index. The particular test we conduct closely follows analysis used recently by Gilchrist, Ya nkov, and Zakrajsek (2009) . For each measure of economic activity, Y t , we denote the annualized change over horizon h as:
We then conduct bivariate vector autoregressions forecasting growth in employment and industrial production. The autoregressions are augmented with the FIHI and other financial variables (FinVar): the monthly percent change in the the S&P 500 and two corporate bond spreads-the spread on Moody's Aaa rated bonds over comparable maturity Treasuries and the spread on Moody's Baa rated bonds over comparable maturity Treasuries. 25 These credit spreads help control for the condition of the non-financial sector and the ability of firms to tap capital markets. The full regressions thus take the form:
where Emp t and IP t indicate nonfarm payroll employment and industrial production for month t. We estimate these equations for horizons h = 3 and h = 12. For comparison purposes, we also estimate equations 7 and 8 without the FIHI. Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares using monthly data from the start of 1973 through the middle of 2009. Standard errors are adjusted following Newey and West (1987) to control for serial correlation introduced by overlapping forecast errors.
The results appear in Tables 5 and 6 . (Coefficients on lagged changes in employment and industrial output are not shown.) The coefficients for the FIHI are statistically significant and indicate that when the financial sector is relatively healthy (higher values) employment and output are likely to grow faster in coming quarters. Equity market gains are also associated with gains in employment and industrial production. By contrast, the coefficients on the credit spreads are generally not significant and on occasion have the opposite sign of what might be expected (with the exception that wider Baa spread are associated with slower grow in industrial production over the next three months). Results for bond-market spreads hold regardless of whether the FIHI is included in the regressions.
These regressions suggest that our measure of financial sector health provides information about future economic activity. Without a formal model it is difficult to know whether this association is part of a causal relationship or whether it is merely a correlation (perhaps related to the forward looking nature of asset prices used to construct the measure). Nevertheless, the results in Section 3 show that declines in financial sector health are associated with a tightening of both the 25 When calculating spreads, we use the constant-maturity Treasury securities available from the Federal Reserve H.15 release. Other investigators have suggested using alternative corporate spreads such as the spread on high-yield bonds over Treasury securities or on commercial paper relative to Treasury bills. Neither of these spreads are available for the full time period used here. Results including these spreads-with the shorter sample period-are similar, but of reduced significance. Note. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Standard errors adjusted following Newey and West (1987) . Coefficients on lagged values of the dependent variable are not reported.
price and non-price lending conditions by banks, a channel through which financial sector health might be expected to affect economic activity. 26
Conclusion
Previous research on the impact that financial conditions have on economic activity over time has often focused on corporate bond spreads and the cost of borrowing for non-financial firms. In this paper, we focus on a second channel involving financial intermediation and the real economy, namely the impact that the health of financial sector intermediaries themselves might have on credit conditions and the macroeconomy. Our work builds on microeconomic studies of bank health, loan costs, and 26 See for instance, Lown and Morgan (2006) and Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydro (2010) who find that tighter lending standards (as measured by SLOOS data) reduce loan growth and output growth. Similarly, in work exploring the response of investment to changes in financing costs, Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (2002) find that measures of bank health are useful instruments for the interest rate that banks charge on their loans and show that investment by individual firms responds fairly strongly to changes in financing costs. Note. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Standard errors adjusted following Newey and West (1987) . Coefficients on lagged values of the dependent variable are not reported.
investment by bank customers (Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia, 2002 , Gibson, 1995 , Peek and Rosengren, 2000 , Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese, 2002 . One contribution of our work, which we hope will be valuable for other researchers, is the construction of a new measure of financial sector health based on a Merton distance-to-default model for the largest financial firms. Weak values of the distance-to-default measures are associated with subsequent failures at the firm level and with recognized periods of financial-sector stress-of which the recent crisis is by far the most severe-in the time-series dimension. Periods in which the financial sector appeared particularly robust are also apparent in our index.
Changes in financial sector health might affect economic activity by affecting the cost and accessibility of credit for non-financial firms to borrow, regardless of the condition of the non-financial firms. The results in this paper are supportive of this hypothesis. We find that deteriorations in our measure of financial sector health are associated with reports by senior bank loan officers that they are tightening lending standards and terms and vice versa. Further, the results are consistent with a role for financial-sector health in economic performance; we find that when financial institutions are healthier, economic activity-as indicated by growth in employment and industrial production-tends to be faster in subsequent months. These results point to the condition of financial intermediaries as a potential independent source of variation in the macroeconomy and, we hope, provide direction for future theoretical work in this area. Table A1 continued 
